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It is natural to think that we are rationally and causally responsive to
the contents of our thoughts, to what they “say” about the world. For
example, it seems that we sometimes directly notice entailment relationships
and inconsistencies between the contents of our thoughts. When we do
this, we seem to reason on the contents of our thoughts and to be causally
responding to the relationships between these contents. In order to allow
that thoughts might also have contents to which we are not rationally and
causally responsive, we can state the point as follows: thoughts have cognitive
contents, contents to which we are rationally and causally responsive.
There has not been much discussion of cognitive content as such, but there
is a large literature on narrow content, which is a closely associated notion (as
I will argue below, cognitive content is plausibly narrow). Many philosophers
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are skeptical of the existence of narrow content. One of the chief reasons for
this skepticism is that it is hard to see how such a thing as narrow content
(whether cognitive or not) could even be possible: how could the brain “reach
out” to grab on to propositions on its own? The aim of this paper is to figure
out what is the best available explanation of narrow, cognitive content. I
won’t try to fully explain how we grab on to propositions, but I hope to say
enough to make it more plausible that we do.
I will start with more background on the notion of cognitive content and
the aforementioned concerns (section 1). I will then briefly argue (mostly
drawing on discussions found elsewhere) that there is reason to take seriously
the view that a mental state’s cognitive content is simply the content that
enters the subject’s phenomenal consciousness (section 2). I will refer to
this view as the phenomenal theory of cognitive content. In section 3, I
address the main challenge to the phenomenal theory. The challenge is that
this theory seems to imply that thoughts that seem to be about abstract
or complex matters often don’t have cognitive contents that capture these
matters (because cognitive phenomenology is not rich enough). I will suggest
that this is an acceptable consequence of the phenomenal theory that explains
some apparently irrational behavior that is otherwise hard to explain. I will
also briefly discuss how the phenomenal theory fits into the scientific view of
the mind as a largely unconscious information processing mechanism (section
4).
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1 Cognitive content and narrow content
Consider the following quote, in which Fodor uses a passage from a Sherlock
Holmes novel to give us a glimpse of what thinking is like:
Here, for example, is Sherlock Holmes doing his thing at the end
of “The Speckled Band”:
I instantly reconsidered my position when . . . it became clear
to me that whatever danger threatened an occupant of the room
couldn’t come either from the window or the door. My attention
was speedily drawn, as I have already remarked to you, to this
ventilator, and to the bell-rope which hung down to the bed. The
discovery that this was a dummy, and that the bed was clamped
to the floor, instantly gave rise to the suspicion that the rope was
there as a bridge for something passing through the hole, and
coming to the bed. The idea of a snake instantly occurred to me,
and when I coupled it with my knowledge that the Doctor was
furnished with a supply of the creatures from India I felt that I
was probably on the right track.
The passage purports to be a bit of reconstructive psychology: a
capsule history of the sequence of mental states which brought
Holmes first to suspect, then to believe, that the doctor did it
with his pet snake. (Fodor 1990, p. 20)
As the Sherlock Holmes passage illustrates and Fodor agrees, we naturally
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think of reasoning or thinking as the manipulation of mental states such as
the suspicion that the rope was there as a bridge or the idea of a snake. It is
natural to think that there is some kind of machinery of thought, and that
this machinery “processes” mental states in broadly the same way that an
assembly line processes input materials and components.
As Fodor also notes, it is not unstructured mental states that are manipu-
lated, but mental states with contents, propositions such as that the rope was
there as a bridge. In Holmes’ monologue as in many reports that we naturally
volunteer, we find the idea that thinking is responsive to relationships between
the contents of mental states, understood as propositions that the mental
states are in some way “about”.
This idea also seems to be part of our conception of rational norms. Very
roughly, a rational person is one whose thinking process does not tolerate
inconsistencies and which produces correct and relevant inferences. Thoughts
are not consistent or inconsistent or justified in abstraction of their contents:
it is in virtue of features of their contents and relationships among their
contents that they can be said to be consistent or inconsistent or to stand
in (doxastic) justificatory relationships to each other. As a result, rational
norms are norms enjoining us to be appropriately responsive to the logical
features of the contents of thought. Since ought implies can, these norms seem
to presuppose that we can be responsive to these logical features: through
internal activity taking place in the brain, the contents of mental states can
be examined and compared, and responses are produced based on what this
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inspection process reveals.
It is natural, then, to think of thinking as a process that takes as inputs
various mental states and, by causally responding to the contents of these
mental states, produces more mental states and behavior. When I talk about
reasoning on content, this is the causal process that I have in mind. As I
already stated in the introduction, I am going to refer to the contents of
mental states that we reason on as cognitive contents. Note that mental states
may or may not have contents beyond their cognitive contents. I am going to
remain largely neutral on this question.
The process of reasoning on content occurs in the brain, so a mental
state’s having a certain cognitive content must be narrow, metaphysically
determined by intrinsic features of the brain. As Hume points out in Section
XV, Book I of the Treatise, “The cause and effect must be contiguous in
space and time.” With the possible exception of quantum entanglement, this
observation has been confirmed over and over again by science. Even gravity,
which at some point seemed to be an exception, has turned out not to involve
any action at a distance. This is why a thermometer must be connected
to the substance whose temperature it responds to, for example, by a wire,
or by being directly immersed in it. The same goes for the mechanisms
that implement reasoning in brains. We know that our reasoning is not
responsive to our mental contents in virtue of causal chains that pass through
the environment (this would not be reasoning proper). Therefore, the brain
activity that constitutes reasoning can only be causally responsive to contents
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that are in some sense in the brain. At the very least, mental states’ cognitive
contents must be metaphysically determined by intrinsic features of brains.1
While it is plausible that all cognitive contents are narrow, it might be
that some narrow contents are not cognitive. In principle at least, there might
be mental contents that are metaphysically determined by internal features of
one’s brain but to which one’s reasoning processes do not have access. Such
contents would be narrow without being cognitive. For example, one might
say that a certain kind of headache has the narrow content high blood pressure
because it signals the presence of high blood pressure. A headache could
have such content without the subject being in a position to reason on this
content.
Such possibilities bring out the fact that cognitive content is what pro-
ponents of narrow content ought to be interested in, not narrow content per
1Philosophers have offered various sophisticated replies to arguments from mental
causation for narrow content. Burge (1986) finds issues with a number of arguments from
mental causation for internalism, but the arguments he considers have little to do with the
above argument, which is much simpler. Williamson (1998) considers an argument that
is similar to, but not quite the same as, the above argument, but his argument takes a
detour through questionable premises. In particular, he assumes that wide mental states
need to factor into internal and external components in order for there to be inner mental
states that cause behavior. Williamson then takes issue with this assumption, which is
incompatible with the primeness of wide states. As Yablo (2003) points out, it is unclear
why we would make this assumption: it might well be that behavior has internal mental
causes that are not exactly components of wide mental states. Yablo’s (1996 and 2003)
own response to arguments for narrow content from mental causation relies heavily on his
proposed analysis of causal relevance in terms of proportionality and naturalness, and on
the assumption that the relevant kind of causation is causal relevance. I would question the
second assumption. Causal relevance, as understood by Yablo, is an epistemically charged
notion very closely associated with explanation. One might say that a different, more
oomphy and less epistemic concept of causation is relevant to the above considerations, for
example, a process or transmission concept of causation (Russell 1912 and Salmon 1984).
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se. As Farkas (2008b) points out, there is nothing special about the skin
boundary, so the thesis that there is narrow content seems arbitrary. This
thesis seems interesting because it is a proxy to other, less arbitrary claims.
One such claim is that mental states have contents to which internal thinking
processes are causally responsive.
Many contemporary theorists reject the preceding picture of reasoning.
There are two main reasons for this. First, arguments by Putnam (1975),
Burge (1979), and Kripke (1980) have convinced many that the contents
of mental states are generally wide (metaphysically determined in part by
factors in the environment). Wide contents cannot be reasoned with in the
kind of way required by the above picture.
Second, as Fodor puts it, if “graspings of propositions” are real, “they must
be really [sic] something else”, because they are not “plausible candidates for
ultimate stuff” (1990, p. 13). At least until recently, there was no plausible
account of narrow content in terms of “something else” (there were formal-
izations of narrow content along broadly two-dimensionalist lines, but no
plausible account of what grounds narrow content). The only real candidate
on the table was short-arm conceptual role semantics (CRS). According to this
view, mental states have their narrow contents in virtue of the complex web of
causal links that tie them to each other, sensory stimuli (physically conceived),
and behavioral outputs (physically conceived). This view suffers from an
explanatory gap: it is just not clear why a big mesh of causal connections
between physical things would result in any thinking at all. It also suffers
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from well-known underdetermination problems.2 In the absence of a plausible
explanation of putative narrow contents in terms of something else, many
have concluded that we don’t reason on mental content. The predominant
view seems to be that thinking is responsive to properties of the vehicles of
mental states that fall short of determining intentional contents.
It is important not to conflate the second line of reasoning against narrow
content with the obvious point that reasoning has to be based on concrete
features of the vehicles of mental states, and so cannot operate on abstract
objects such as propositions per se. Even if we grant that propositions, qua
abstract objects, are not causally efficacious in reasoning, we can still hold
that a mental state’s having of a certain proposition as content (a grasping
of a proposition, as Fodor puts it) is a concrete event that can be localized
in the brain and causally efficacious qua grasping of a certain proposition.
Alternatively, we might compromise a little and say that we can be causally
responsive to a mental state’s content (or something close enough to this)
by being causally responsive to concrete features of a mental state that
metaphysically determine its content. Neither of these kinds of causal contact
with contents can be ruled out at the outset. Skepticism regarding causal
contact with propositions arises not from the obvious impossibility of this kind
of contact, but from pessimism regarding the prospects of giving a satisfactory
account of the grounds of narrow content.
2Underdetermination objections to such views are raised by Putnam (1981, ch. 2,
appendix), Kripke (1982), Horgan and Tienson (2002a), Strawson (2008), and Goff (2012),
among others.
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This skepticism about narrow, and, by extension, cognitive content has
prevailed for many years, but the tide is starting to turn. Today, many
theorists take the arguments for externalism to show not that mental content
is generally wide, but that mental states generally have both wide and narrow
contents. Furthermore, a theory of narrow (or cognitive) content that skeptics
about narrow content have largely overlooked has come to be widely endorsed:
the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT).3 According to this theory, there
is a kind of intentionality that arises solely from phenomenal consciousness
and that grounds all other kinds of intentionality (if any).4 The next section
discusses the application of this theory to cognitive content. This will lead us
to identify a core challenge for this application of PIT, which the rest of the
paper aims to address.
2 The phenomenal intentionality theory
PIT is promising as an approach to intentionality in general because con-
sciousness and intentionality seem to be intimately related. The paradigm
3Chudnoff (2015, ch. 6) suggests that arguments for externalism also show that phe-
nomenal intentionality is wide, which would undercut attempts to shore up narrow or
cognitive content using PIT. I cannot go into this here, but I disagree that the arguments
for externalism apply to phenomenal intentionality.
4Proponents of PIT, or something close to it, include Strawson (1994, 2000, 2004, 2008),
Siewert (1998), Horgan & Tienson (2002a), Horgan et al. (2004), Loar (2003), Kriegel
(2003, 2011b), Pitt (2004, 2011), Pautz (2008, 2013), Farkas (2008a, 2008b), Mendola
(2008), Bourget (2010), Chudnoff (2011b, 2011a and 2011b, 2015), and Smithies (2011a,
2011b, 2013b). See especially Mendelovici forthcoming for a systematic development and
defense of a version of PIT very congenial to the account of cognitive content I defend
in this paper. Bourget and Mendelovici 2016 introduces the acronym “PIT” and offers a
detailed overview of the debates surrounding PIT.
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cases of phenomenal states (states of consciousness) are states that seem to
present something. For example, when I perceive (or hallucinate) a red cube
in front of me, there is a certain “what it’s like” to my mental state, and there
is also a way the world could be that is being presented. I am “told” that the
world is a certain way. I experience a red cube, and I also represent a red
cube. These two facets of my mental state are intimately related. In fact, it
seems inconceivable that I could experience a red cube in just this way, yet
not be presented with a red cube. In virtue of having this experience, there
is some intentional content (there is a red cube) that is there before my mind.
We can refer to the intentional content that we entertain simply in virtue of
having an experience with a certain phenomenal character as the phenomenal
content of the experience.5
Phenomenal states appear to be narrow. One reason to think that phe-
nomenal states are narrow is that they cause bodily movements. When you
are in excruciating pain, for example, it seems that your screams are triggered
by the pain without the intermediary of environmental factors. Barring any
action at a distance, this can only be the case if the pain is in your brain,
where it is triggering the screaming mechanism.6
5For more on phenomenal intentionality, see Siewert 1998, Crane 2003, Thompson
2003, Chalmers 2004, Siegel 2005, 2007, 2010, Pautz 2010, Smithies 2013a,b, Bourget and
Mendelovici 2016, and Mendelovici forthcoming.
6This example makes it clear that experiences are not merely structuring causes of
bodily movements, which is a kind of causation that is more plausibly compatible with
externalism (see Dretske 1995). In “Anomalous Panpsychism” (forthcoming c), I question
this kind of evidence for mental causation, but I offer additional evidence that is no less
supportive of an internal causal role for experience.
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The narrowness of phenomenal states and the fact that they are by nature
intentional make their phenomenal contents good candidate ingredients for
explaining cognitive contents. It also seems independently plausible that
some phenomenal contents are cognitive contents. For example, when we
perceptually experience a way the world might be, we seem to have an
excellent cognitive grasp on that way the world might be. This is so even if we
don’t assume that immediate perceptual beliefs themselves involve reasoning:
they at least put us in a position to reason about their objects. It seems,
then, that at least some cognitive contents are phenomenal contents.
It seems to me that such an account of cognitive content adequately
addresses the Fodorian challenge to cognitive content. Fodor’s challenge
arises from the claim that if it exists, narrow (or cognitive) content should be
explainable in terms of something else. In the absence of a suitable something
else, this can lead one to doubt that cognitive content exists. If we can identify
cognitive contents with phenomenal contents, we safeguard the former from
elimination, because phenomenal content is the “something else”7. Crucially,
Fodor’s challenge cannot be re-iterated at the level of the explanans, because
consciousness is not something that we are prepared to eliminate if it proves
impossible to reduce: we do not believe that in order for consciousness to
exist it must really be something else.8
The fact that we seem able to adequately account for some cognitive
7Phenomenal content is at least conceptually distinct from cognitive content, and I take
it that this is the relevant standard of otherness, since reduction is consistent with identity.
8These issues are discussed in greater detail in Mendelovici and Bourget 2014.
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contents in terms of consciousness is very promising for a PIT-like view of
cognitive content. So far, no other approach has succeeded at explaining any
cognitive content. The only alternative approach is short-arm conceptual role
semantics, which suffers from an explanatory gap, and, as a result, cannot
explain any cognitive content.
There are two ways that a PIT-like view of all cognitive contents could
be developed. First, we could try to identify all cognitive contents with
phenomenal contents. I will refer to this as the phenomenal theory of cognitive
content. Proponents of such a view of narrow content (and, by extension,
cognitive content) include Strawson (2008), Mendelovici (forthcoming), and
myself (Mendelovici & Bourget forthcoming). Second, we could try to identify
some cognitive contents with phenomenal contents, or otherwise ground
them directly in phenomenal contents, while accounting for other cognitive
contents less directly in terms of consciousness. A relatively widespread view
along these lines is phenomenal functionalism.9 On this view, some cognitive
contents are grounded directly in consciousness, while others are grounded in
functional roles that involve states with phenomenal content. For example,
one might say that sensory experiences of colors directly represent specific
colors in virtue of their phenomenal characters, but the abstract concept
of a color gets its content through functional connections to experiences of
colors, shapes, and perhaps other things. A number of theorists have put
forward versions of phenomenal functionalism for narrow content or closely
9This label is borrowed from Pautz (2013), who uses it a little more narrowly.
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related views, including Horgan and Tienson (2002a), Loar (2003), Horgan
et al. (2004), Mendola (2008), Kriegel (2011a,b), Smithies (2012a, 2013a,b,
2014), Horgan and Graham (2012), and Pautz (2013). Chalmers (2012) is
also sympathetic.
The main reason behind phenomenal functionalism’s relative popularity
(among proponents of PIT-like views) is that a view such as the phenomenal
theory seems to require more cognitive phenomenology than there is. In
order for the phenomenal theory to account for the cognitive contents of
occurrent thoughts in the same way that it accounts for the cognitive contents
of a perceptual experience in the above example, there would have to be
cognitive experiences, states of consciousness that occur as part of thought
processes. These cognitive experiences would need to have phenomenal
contents that span the complete range of cognitive contents we can have in
thought. They would have to be part of all thoughts with cognitive content,
or to be these thoughts. In other words, there would have to be a lot of
cognitive phenomenology. The problem is that there does not seem to be
that much cognitive phenomenology. The phenomenal theory also faces a
challenge with respect to standing propositional attitudes, which have no
phenomenology at all, but I take it that this challenge is derivative on the
challenge for occurrent thoughts.10
10Most proponents of PIT-like views hold that standing propositional attitudes are
dispositional: they are dispositions to have certain occurrent thoughts and/or behave in
certain ways. On such a view of standing attitudes, it seems plausible that they do not
in themselves have cognitive content, because we don’t reason on them at all—we reason
on occurrent mental states that they are dispositions to token. In any case, it is plausible
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It is important not to exaggerate the challenge with occurrent thoughts.
It is arguable that many concepts are associated with a phenomenology that
is characteristic of their contents. Consider, for example, the concepts circle,
above, object, wrong, animal, person, meaning, and causation. For each of
these, there seems to be something characteristic it is like to use the concept
(at least in optimal conditions, if one is putting in enough effort to grasp
the idea). The phenomenology that goes with these concepts seems to be
non-imagistic and genuinely non-sensory. No doubt, the phenomenal contents
associated with these concepts are not equivalent to the dictionary definitions
of “circle”, “above”, etc., but this is to be expected. It is clear that the contents
of our thoughts only roughly match the conventional meanings of the words
we use to express them.11 Bearing this in mind, the phenomenal theory
seems to offer a promising account of the cognitive contents of many thoughts,
including in particular many thoughts involving relatively basic, plausibly
innate concepts such as the above.12
However, even granting that there is considerable cognitive phenomenology
and associated phenomenal content, it is not pre-theoretically and prima
facie obvious that the phenomenal theory can account for all the apparent
cognitive contents of thoughts. The greatest challenge for the phenomenal
theory is that thoughts about highly complex and/or abstract matters often
that we could account for the cognitive contents of propositional attitudes (if any) given a
satisfactory account of the cognitive contents of occurrent thoughts.
11I talk about this a little more below.
12For more detailed defenses of cognitive phenomenology, see Strawson 1994, Siewert
1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002b, Goff 2012, Smithies 2013a,b, Chudnoff 2015.
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seem to have cognitive contents that far outstrip associated phenomenology.
Take for example thoughts about democracy. On the face of it, there is no
phenomenology characteristic of thinking about democracy. Typically at least,
thoughts about democracy are associated with visual and verbal imagery,
and perhaps other kinds of sensory imagery, but it doesn’t seem that there
is a phenomenal state whose phenomenal content has to do with democracy
per se. Recall that phenomenal content is content that a mental state has
simply in virtue of its phenomenal character. This means that a mental
state’s phenomenal content is metaphysically determined by its phenomenal
character. The visual and verbal imagery that reliably accompanies thoughts
about democracy might be sufficient for thinking about things such as people,
boxes with slits, folded papers, check marks, the word “democracy”, the word
“vote”, etc., but it does not seem to capture the full-blown idea of a system of
government in which free votes by a large, inclusive segment of the population
is used to select representatives or decide governance questions directly (or
something like this). Yet it does seem that the above definition, or something
similar, has to be the cognitive content of typical thoughts about democracy,
because we apply such definitions when assessing the rationality of thoughts
about democracy.13
Consider, for example, Fred. Fred seems to have a good understanding
13Pautz (2008) is also skeptical of complex cognitive phenomenology. In Pautz 2013, he
offers an argument against such phenomenology that goes beyond introspection. Mendelovici
(forthcoming) is as skeptical of complex and abstract cognitive phenomenology as I am
and fleshes out a detailed response to this problem that is closely related to the response I
give later in this paper.
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of the idea of democracy, as witnessed by his giving us the above definition
when prompted. However, Fred insists that the kingdom of Louis XIV was
a democracy in which the king had a birth right to rule absolutely until his
death. Without knowing anything more about Fred, it is natural to think
that he is being irrational: he is having incoherent thoughts. Fred seems so
blatantly inconsistent, we have trouble imagining what is on his mind. This
understanding of Fred takes the cognitive content of the thought that he
expresses using the term “democracy” to include something like the content
that he gives us when we ask him for a definition of “democracy”. This view
of Fred’s cognitive content seems inconsistent with Fred’s cognitive content
being a phenomenal content, because Fred does not have phenomenology
that captures this definition. So it seems that democracy thoughts can have
complex cognitive contents that outstrip their phenomenal contents.
Thoughts about abstract mathematical objects also illustrate the challenge
for the phenomenal theory. Consider, for example, Josie’s occurrent thought
to the effect that a 6-cube has 32 vertices (a 6-cube is the six-dimensional
analog of a cube). It seems that Josie and anybody else with a minimum
of background in geometry can think about a 6-cube and entertain various
propositions about it. At the same time, it seems that in entertaining the
proposition that a 6-cube has 32 vertices, Josie is making an error of logic or
reasoning (broadly construed), because it is logically impossible for a 6-cube
to have 32 vertices. So it seems that the cognitive content of a thought
about a 6-cube captures the nature of 6-cubes, including the fact that they
16
necessarily have 64 vertices. Yet it is doubtful that the phenomenology of such
thoughts captures the nature of 6-cubes. A normal person, in any case, cannot
visualize a six-dimensional figure in the same way that she can visualize a
three-dimensional figure, and there seems to be no non-visual phenomenology
of six-dimensional figures.14
I am going to refer to thoughts with apparently highly abstract or complex
cognitive contents as high-level thoughts. Phenomenal functionalism is a natu-
ral response to the challenge that high-level thoughts pose to the phenomenal
theory. However, it is a kind of tactical retreat. We start off with a clear,
precise, and perfectly intelligible account of cognitive contents: they are
phenomenal contents. When this seems to fail, we introduce a qualification:
perhaps the contents we can’t account for in this way somehow arise from
the phenomenally grounded ones and something else. There is really nothing
other than functional role to appeal to, so phenomenal functionalism seems
to be our only option. This motivation for phenomenal functionalism seems
quite ad hoc.15 As a result, I think we can plausibly say that if the problem
of high-level thoughts could be addressed consistently with the simple, pure
phenomenal theory, this theory would be more attractive.
Another reason for giving the simple phenomenal theory a try first is that
14In a recent paper (forthcoming b), I argue that there are no differences in kind between
perceptual, imagistic, and cognitive phenomenology: only differences in content. Given
such a view, the absence of imagistic phenomenology for visual contents implies the absence
of phenomenology simpliciter.
15Pautz (2013) might have a better motivation for phenomenal functionalism from a
broadly Lewisian view of propositional attitudes.
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phenomenal functionalism seems to suffer from the same explanatory gap
that plagues its non-phenomenal cousin, short-arm conceptual role semantics:
why should a large tangle of causal relations between phenomenal experiences
that have relatively simple or concrete contents somehow amount to thinking
a more abstract or complex content? Mendelovici (forthcoming) develops this
argument in more detail. This prima facie explanatory gap problem, and the
additional simplicity and elegance of the simple phenomenal theory, suggest
that the latter theory would be much more attractive if its problem with
high-level thoughts could be solved. This is what I hope to make progress on
in the rest of this paper.
3 A deflationary view of cognitive content
While I am primarily concerned with the problem of high-level occurrent
thoughts, some key facts about standing propositional attitudes are relevant.
Beliefs, desires, and other standing propositional attitudes are not states
that we simply see for what they are: in order to figure out what our own
beliefs and desires are, we have to engage in some theorizing and reflection.
This theorizing makes various assumptions. For example, it assumes that the
thoughts that come to mind on any given occasion tend to reflect what we
believe, and that what we believe and desire explains what we do. When
ascribing standing propositional attitudes to others, we make even more
assumptions. For example, we rely heavily on the principle of charity and
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on the assumption that people generally say pretty much exactly what they
think.
This means that, in general, we can only expect the contents of standing
propositional attitudes ascribed by folk psychology to correspond very roughly
to what is really going on in the subject’s mind. Consider in particular the
implications of the assumption that people generally say what they think,
which is clearly central to our practice of propositional attitude ascription
(in many cases, our grounds for saying that someone believes P is simply
that they have said so). When I say that democracy is a good system of
governance, the proposition that I am stating is arguably a proposition made
up in large part of the linguistic meanings of the terms “democracy”, “good”,
and so on. The linguistic meanings of these terms are somehow grounded in
conventions, which are plausibly grounded ultimately in what various people
are inclined to say or think about such terms. When “what is said” is seen in
this light, it becomes obvious that we should only expect a very rough match
between what is said and what is thought. This holds true of utterances such
as “I believe that P” as well: we have no more ability to select words that
exactly convey our internal state of mind when we say “I believe that P” than
when we merely assert “P” on its own.
In sum, propositional attitudes rely heavily on rough heuristics and must
necessarily cut corners due to the nature of public language. This goes a long
way toward resisting the difficult cases for a phenomenal theory of cognitive
content. This is because our conception of our occurrent thoughts is quite
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closely connected with our conception of our standing propositional attitudes:
we generally think of our occurrent thoughts as simple manifestations of our
standing attitudes. As a result, we can expect the accuracy of ascriptions
of occurrent thoughts to be negatively affected by the general inaccuracy of
standing attitude ascriptions. This gives us reason to take intuitive ascriptions
of occurrent thoughts and related properties (such as rationality) with a grain
of salt. In particular, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to suggest that the case
where we hold Josie to be irrational because she thinks 6-cubes have 32
vertices might be one where we are projecting more cognitive content than
there really is. Similarly, we might be projecting more cognitive content than
there really is in Fred’s case. We picture him having thoughts whose cognitive
contents correspond fairly closely to the meanings of sentences he is disposed
to utter, but this might be a gross oversimplification of the reality. If we could
look directly into Josie’s and Fred’s heads, we might see that the contents
that they reason on are not the high-level contents that we are inclined to
ascribe to them.
In some respects, this picture is revisionary and runs against naïve as-
criptions, but common sense also provides support for it. Reflection on cases
suggests that we can distinguish between two different ways of thinking a
proposition: we can grasp it, which puts us in a position to reason competently
about it, and we can think it without grasping it, which leaves us unable to
reason competently about it. For example, consider the difference between
these claims:
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SUN The volume of the Sun is 1.412× 1018 km3.
SQUARE There is a square.
Intuitively, I have an excellent grasp of SQUARE, but a poor grasp of SUN.
One might put the point like this: I really know what a square is, but I don’t
really know how big 1.412 × 1018 km3 is. This intuitive, felt difference is
reflected in my reasoning capabilities. Given SQUARE, I can draw various
inferences, such as that something has four sides. I can do so independently
of the language used to convey SQUARE to me. In contrast, when thinking
about SUN (or at least its numerical component), I find myself almost entirely
dependent on symbol manipulation: whether or not I can easily infer a given
proposition from SUN seems to depend largely on the language in which SUN
and the other proposition are expressed, as well as the nature of the rules
that I know for manipulating the relevant expressions. For example, I can
easily tell that SUN entails SUN/10, but I cannot as easily tell that it entails
SUN/8.
SUN/10 If the Sun’s volume were ten times smaller, it would be 1.412×1017
km3.
SUN/8 If the Sun’s volume were eight times smaller, it would be 1.765×1017
km3.
We can restate the preceding claims in base 8 (rounding the volume of the
Sun in base 8, as we did in base 10):
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SUN8 The volume of the Sun is 1.163× 1024 km3.
SUN/88 If the Sun’s volume were eight times smaller, it would be 1.163×1023
km3.
SUN/108 If the Sun’s volume were ten times smaller, it would be 7.65×1022
km3.
Now the relationship between SUN8 and SUN/88 is obvious, but the relation-
ship between SUN8 and SUN/108 is not.16 This illustrates the fact that, at
least when thinking about large numbers, we seem to reason entirely with
numerals, following numeral-handling rules, not with the numbers themselves;
otherwise, the base of representation should make no difference to the obvi-
ousness of inferences. I am using very large numbers for effect here, but this is
true of pretty much all numbers except the smallest natural numbers.17 Again,
this contrasts with SQUARE. In the case of SQUARE, it does not matter
what words we use to state the proposition (so long as we understand it).
The difference between SUN and SQUARE illustrates the contrast between
grasping a content, which allows us to reason about it, and merely grasping
symbols that stand for the content, which only allows us to reason using
syntactic rules about symbols.18
16SUN/108 is rounded, so there is strictly speaking no entailment, but the example
nevertheless illustrates my point; the relationship would be even less clear if I showed the
precise result.
17I am not sure where to draw the line, which might be subject-dependent, but we
plausibly have some kind of grasp of natural numbers up to 5.
18I discuss a variant on the preceding argument in more detail in (Bourget forthcoming
a).
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Of course, it is possible to grasp some facts that are related to SUN. For
example, there are infographics that compare the relationship between the
volume of the Sun and the volume of the Earth to the relationship between
the volume of a basketball and the volume of an apple seed. It seems that
being presented with such a visual comparison instantly enables one to grasp
the relative sizes of the Sun and the Earth. This also gives us some inferential
abilities: applying one’s knowledge and grasp of facts about basketballs and
apple seeds, one can infer, for example, that the diameter of the Sun is at
least 20 times the diameter of the earth (you can see this simply by visualizing
apple seeds lined in front of a basketball). The analogy, however, does not
allow one to grasp the absolute, precise volume of the Sun, which is what is
at issue here. We also have a fuzzy sense of large numbers, but this does not
confer us a grasp of precise claims such as SUN.19
Chudnoff (2015, ch. 2) also gives mathematical examples that illustrate
the intuitive difference between grasping and not grasping a content. In one
example, he notes that the proposition if a < 1, then 2 - 2a >0 is a fact that
we can simply “see” (grasp). In contrast, the Goldbach conjecture, that every
even integer greater than 2 is the sum of two primes, seems to elude this sort
of immediate intellectual grasping. The first proposition is not just easy to
grasp, it is also easy to reason with, and the second is not just hard to grasp,
it is also hard to reason with. This further reinforces the idea that not all
contents that we can in some sense think are cognitive contents: it seems that
19See Carey 2009.
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a content must be grasped to be cognitive.
Consider also this example.20 Most people know that millions of individuals
die of preventable poverty every year. The typical response to such statistics
is not very strong. Yet take a child who is dying of simple malnutrition and
bring them to the average North American’s dwelling, and you can expect an
empathic and generous response. As Peter Singer (2009) stresses, we seem to
be egregiously inconsistent in our moral responses: we should be far more
moved by the fact that millions are dying of preventable poverty than by
the fact that one child is, but many of us won’t give a single dollar to the
millions. A natural explanation of this discrepancy is that we cannot fully
cognize, grasp, or have as cognitive content the proposition that millions are
dying of poverty, whereas we can grasp the plight of the one child. On this
view of the matter, we are not systematically, egregiously inconsistent in our
moral responses, or at least not as far as the rational mind is concerned: in
cases where we grasp the needs of others, we do act to help, but in cases
where we merely grasp words and numerals, we are not moved to help. This
makes sense, since, obviously, words and numerals don’t need help. To the
extent that we merely grasp words and numerals, we are unable to apply our
moral sense to the relevant facts.
(I hasten to add that this is no excuse for egoism. The real ethical upshot
of these observations is that we ought to ensure that we grasp the facts that are
relevant to our decisions, not that we are excused from ethical norms because
20Also discussed in my (forthcoming a).
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we don’t really know what we’re doing. When important decisions need to be
made, we ought to look past the veil of symbols. This duty is similar to, and
in line with, the duty to try to gather appropriate information when making
decisions, as well as the duty to avoid making important decisions when
unable to think clearly. While not excusing anyone, the fact that arguably
immoral behavior can be explained by a lack of grasping rather than a lack of
moral sensitivity suggests a different approach to morality than a philosopher
might be inclined to take: we don’t need more arguments, we need a better
grasp of the stakes. This is not in general something that can be acquired
through reasoning alone.)
Examples such as the preceding suggest that not all the contents that we
can in some broad sense think are cognitive contents. They also illustrate
the fact that the contents that we have most trouble grasping tend to be
abstract or complex. In general, the contents that we have trouble grasping
and reasoning with seem to be just the contents that we are least likely to be
able to phenomenally represent, such as contents involving large magnitudes,
large numbers of people, or abstract, non-perceptible properties. As a result,
the phenomenal theory’s prediction that highly abstract or complex contents
cannot be cognitive contents seems quite plausible. It is an initially surprising
prediction that arguably confirms the theory.
To return to the examples used earlier, it seems plausible, in light of
the above discussion, that typical democracy thoughts and typical thoughts
about six-dimensional figures fall short of involving a grasp of democracy or
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six-dimensional figures, respectively. In the case of six-dimensional figures,
it seems that one can never grasp this. It is almost completely opaque
what follows from the claim that something is a 6-cube. One has to reason
semi-formally on the basis of what one knows about cubes. In the case of
democracy, it might be that one can form a phenomenal representation of
democracy with great difficulty, but I would not rest my theory on this.
Against the background of the limitations on cognitive content highlighted
above, any putative counterexample of this sort can plausibly be seen as a
case where there is not just no relevant phenomenal content, but also no
relevant cognitive content.
The phenomenal theory does not merely predict the correct limitations
on cognitive content, but it sheds new light on these limitations. On the
assumption that cognitive content is phenomenal content, it is easy to see
how the limitations on cognitive content noted above arise. For example, it
is plausible that only small natural numbers can be precisely represented in
consciousness. This seems introspectively obvious, and there is also empirical
evidence for this claim.21 If the phenomenal theory is true, this means that we
can only reason on propositions involving small integers. Why is it that the
apple seed/basketball model enables one to (approximately) grasp the relation
that obtains between the volume of the Sun and the volume of the Earth?
The phenomenal theory predicts that this is the case because the model allows
21See the discussion in Bourget forthcoming a, which draws on the empirical work
discussed in Carey 2009 and Dehaene 1999.
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us to visually experience that very relation, or something close to it: while
the absolute volumes of the Sun and the Earth are beyond our grasp, their
ratio is not so large as to be impossible to perceive in a scale model. Why is
it that we behave as we do in the face of poverty statistics? Assuming that
cognitive content is phenomenal content, it is easy to explain why we have
weak responses to poverty statistics compared to directly perceived suffering:
a million of people dying of poverty just cannot enter our consciousness. As a
result, when we consider poverty statistics, we only bring into consciousness
words and numerals. In contrast, one person’s suffering might be able to
enter our consciousness, especially with the benefit of direct perception, which
sustains the content in consciousness. The mind only has access to cognitive
contents (phenomenal contents), so, from its point of view, it is perfectly
rational to respond more vigorously to the needs of the one individual than
to the needs of the millions reported as general statistics. The phenomenal
theory explains this apparently irrational behavior.
Contrast the phenomenal theory’s predictions regarding high-level thoughts
with those of a view such as phenomenal functionalism, understood as a theory
of cognitive content. It is not clear exactly how contents get fixed on the
latter view, but the general idea is that complex inferential connections can
determine the cognitive contents of thoughts. Presumably, when a subject’s
thought T is so connected with other thoughts that the subject is (by human
standards) excellent at drawing all and only the inferences that would be valid
if the content of T were P, then T’s content is P. The problem is that we can
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be excellent at reasoning with a thought as if it enabled us to grasp P, but
without grasping P. For example, people that are good with numbers seem to
be able to reason very competently with large numbers. Intuitively, they only
reason with numerals, but their numeral handling skills are such that, if one
can represent P in virtue of implementing the right inferential dispositions,
they should represent numbers in virtue of their inferential dispositions. In
this way, it seems that phenomenal functionalism predicts too much cognitive
content.
In summary, the phenomenal theory, together with the fact that cognitive
phenomenology is relatively limited, has the initially surprising implication
that many abstract or complex propositions that we are inclined to describe
as our mental contents are not cognitive contents. In this section, I have
suggested that we should not see this as refuting the theory. On the contrary,
it seems that this implication of the phenomenal theory explains otherwise
puzzling facts about human reasoning and rationality. Unlike phenomenal
functionalism, the phenomenal theory of cognitive content seems to predict
just the right limitations on cognitive content. This is a strong point in favor
of the phenomenal theory.
4 Beyond cognitive content
The phenomenal theory paints a picture of reasoning on which genuine
processing of contents can be difficult to achieve because it depends on
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conscious awareness. As I have tried to show, this accords with familiar
observations regarding what we can and cannot grasp, and this explains
certain striking facts about ourselves. However, this also seems to run counter
to the received wisdom that much thinking is unconscious. If cognitive content
is content that we reason on and cognitive content is phenomenal content, it
might seem that a lot of what we naturally call “reasoning” or “thinking” is
not reasoning at all, because it does not involve phenomenal representations
of relevant contents. This section develops my answer to this objection.
My answer has two parts corresponding to two different kinds of cases in
which we seem to reason on a content P without phenomenally representing
P. In the first kind of case, there is some consciousness involved in the alleged
reasoning process, but it is not consciousness of P. In the other kind of case,
there is no consciousness involved. I will first consider the first kind of case.
In many cases in which we seem to reason about P without consciously
grasping P, our thinking involves a kind of internal monologue, that is, a
series of experiences in which we hear ourselves speaking certain words. Such
internal monologues are a prominent feature of reasoning about abstract or
complex matters such as democracy, numbers, etc. As a result, consciously
reasoning about democracy plausibly involves entertaining thoughts whose
phenomenal contents are uninterpreted or largely uninterpreted symbols.
We can refer to such thoughts as symbolic thoughts. Note that symbolic
thoughts can be involved in reasoning consistently with the phenomenal
theory, because they have phenomenal contents just like other cognitive
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experiences. Therefore, nothing in the phenomenal theory requires us to
say that we don’t in fact reason in cases that we are tempted to describe as
instances of reasoning about abstract matters such as democracy, so long as
such reasoning is reflected in conscious symbolic thoughts. This already goes
a long way toward accommodating the received wisdom.
The phenomenal theory can also accommodate the intuition that such
instances of reasoning are properly described as instances of reasoning about
matters such as democracy, at least in some loose sense of “about”. It can
accommodate this by recognizing that the terms we represent in symbolic
thoughts are in some sense about non-linguistic matters such as democracy.
For this reason, manipulating these symbols in consciousness is a way of
thinking about democracy. What it is not is a way of thinking or reasoning
on democracy, because we cannot bring democracy in consciousness.
One might want to know what makes an uninterpreted symbol such
as “democracy” represented in inner speech be “about” an entity such as
democracy, which we cannot phenomenally grasp. There are different possible
answers here. In effect, any theory of reference could satisfactorily account for
the fact that the term “democracy” used in inner speech by an English speaker
is in some sense about democracy. However, one might think that cognitive
content ought to, in some sense, fix reference. For if cognitive content is what
we reason on but it does not fix what our thoughts are about, then it seems
that what our thoughts are about, and by extension, their truth conditions,
will potentially come apart from reasoning. What good is reasoning that does
30
not track truth conditions?
We can give something like an account of the reference of the inner speech
term “democracy” in terms of cognitive content, but note first that reasoning
would track truth conditions even if we could not give such an account. For
cognitive contents, even if phenomenal, are bona fide propositions, which either
are or determine truth conditions (depending on one’s view on propositions).
What is at stake is not whether reasoning tracks truth conditions but whether
it tracks the truth conditions specified by contents of high-level thoughts that
are too abstract or complex for us to grasp. We already know that reasoning
is not causally responsive to such truth conditions (see the preceding section).
As I just said, we can give something like an account of the reference of
“democracy” in inner speech in terms of cognitive content. We can do so in
terms of what Mendelovici (forthcoming) terms derived representation. The
general idea is that the term “democracy” used in inner speech cashes out into a
descriptive content D that rigidly denotes democracy. By “descriptive content”,
I mean roughly what a linguistic description of the form “the F” contributes
to the proposition expressed by a sentence in which it figures. “Cashing out”
is a technical term that we can define as follows: a content C1 cashes out
into another content C2 (for a given subject in certain circumstances) just
in case either the subject is disposed to consciously represent that by C1, I
[the subject] mean C2, or she is disposed to consciously represent that by C1,
I [the subject] mean C3, where the parts of C3 cash out into such contents
that, when they are brought together in the logical form specified by C3, they
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form an expression that is equivalent to C2. For example, we are disposed
to recursively cash out the symbolic content “democracy” and the terms in
whatever definition we might give of it into further linguistic expressions
until we reach non-symbolic contents that we can directly grasp. When a
thought’s content cashes out into a content such as the actual F (a rigid
description) and the actual F is x, it is natural to say that the subject is in
some sense thinking about x. This is how thoughts that merely represent the
word “democracy” end up being in some sense thoughts about democracy, at
least in some loose sense.
We cannot typically cash out all the symbols represented by all our
symbolic thoughts at the same time, but we can do it in a piecemeal fashion,
and, if we were to combine the different, maximally cashed out contents
together, we would have descriptive contents that pick out non-linguistic
items. The descriptive contents that pick out non-linguistic items can take
two main forms. In many cases, they are mere metalinguistic descriptive
contents such as the thing actually called “democracy” around here. In other
cases, they can be qualitative descriptive contents such as the the actual long
orange vegetable.22
This view of how symbolic thoughts get to be “about” non-linguistic
items borrows from descriptivism and functionalism. However, there is
a crucial difference, which is that I don’t claim that this dispositionalist-
22Jackson (1998a,b) and Chalmers (2002, 2012) explain in detail how broadly-speaking
descriptive conditions can account for reference.
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descriptivist story is sufficient to account for the reference of “democracy”
either in public language or in inner speech. The above is a (simplified)
story that reflects how we juggle terms in inner speech, as well as how we
end up regarding our thoughts as being about things such as democracy,
but I don’t think we can reasonably take this account to characterize an
objective, determinate reference for all or most contents that we don’t grasp
in consciousness. The problem is that exactly how one is disposed to cash
out one’s use of “democracy” is circumstance-dependent, where the relevant
circumstances encompass anything that might influence what one does, from
drugs to one’s level of hydration. In one circumstance, I might cash out this
term one way, and in another I might cash it out another way. We might be
tempted to regard some circumstances as abnormal and irrelevant, but I don’t
think we can draw a principled line between the conditions that are relevant
and those that are not.23 For this reason, I prefer to think of the foregoing
not as an account of the unique, determinate meanings and referents of terms
in public language or inner speech, but as an account of why we are inclined
to think that a term such as “democracy” has a well-defined meaning and
referent. Put differently, I would agree that “democracy” is about democracy
only in some very loose sense that allows that it is also about myriad other
things that we might in some circumstance or other pick out using some
cashing out of this term.
23This is at bottom the same as the problem of collateral information for conceptual role
semantics (Block 1986) and Kripke’s (1982) plus-quus problem.
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While symbolic thoughts fall short of being about anything non-linguistic
in any robust sense, and while thinking symbolically about something is very
different from grasping it consciously in thought, we should not underestimate
the power of symbolic thought. When the system of symbols is well designed,
many logical connections between contents can be encoded as syntactic
connections between symbols. This is just what we aim to do with logical
systems. This is also why the arabic numerals are so well suited to certain
forms of reasoning about numbers. Clever usage of symbolic manipulation
is a crucial way in which we expand our cognitive abilities beyond our raw
rational abilities grounded in consciousness.
In this respect, there is an illuminating analogy between the role of
consciousness in the mind and the role of a CPU in a modern computer. To
make the analogy vivid, let me briefly outline how a CPU does its work. A
CPU “understands” a limited set of machine language instructions, in that it is
only responsive to these instructions. These instructions tell the CPU to make
simple transformations to the arrays of bytes in its memory. The interesting
part is how the CPU is made to emulate an understanding of higher-level
instructions such as print “hello”. For the CPU, a high-level instruction such
as print “hello” starts up as a simple array of bytes in memory. The CPU
only “sees” the bytes, not their “printy” meaning. However, the CPU has in
memory programs (series of machine language instructions) that it can follow
to compile (we could also say “cash out”) a series of bytes such as this into a
series of machine language instructions. The result of this compiling process
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is a different series of bytes that is a series of machine-level instructions that
will result in a certain output device printing “hello” when followed. Note
that the CPU can also perform operations on the original print “hello” bytes
without compiling them. In its memory, print “hello” is just an array of about
14 bytes, and it can do anything with them. For example, it can copy the
bytes around in memory or send them out as-is to a peripheral.
On the picture I am suggesting, consciousness is the CPU of the mind.
Our machine language is made up of the different contents that can enter
our consciousness, and we are only truly responsive to those contents. How-
ever, some of the things that we represent in consciousness (orthographic
shapes) have a privileged role because we program ourselves to cash them
out into machine-language instructions (further conscious contents). Through
a scaffolding process not unlike the scaffolding of programming languages,
we can also build complex symbolic concepts out of simpler symbolic con-
cepts, which allows us to simulate a grasp of much more complex languages
than we truly understand. Like computers, we also sometimes manipulate
high-level instructions without compiling them, which is useful in all kinds
of ways, some of which I sketched above. In brief, the phenomenal theory
makes sense of the odd, pervasive practice of talking to ourselves: this is a
computational technique used to simulate manipulation of contents that we
cannot consciously grasp.
So far, I have talked about how the phenomenal theory can accommo-
date the point that we are able to reason about democracy when we do so
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consciously but without consciously representing democracy: these are real
episodes of reasoning because we are manipulating contents in consciousness,
and they are in some loose sense episodes of reasoning about democracy be-
cause the contents that we manipulate are loosely speaking about democracy,
but they are not episodes of reasoning on democracy. This does not account
for episodes of reasoning that seem completely unconscious. For example,
much of our intelligence lies in work done seemingly unconsciously by our
perceptual systems, which seem to “infer” various features of objects. None of
the difficult work of searching for relevant memories, evaluating thoughts for
relevance, and figuring out the meanings of words in context involves much
consciousness, as far as we can tell. It is also a familiar fact that we can solve
problems without consciously thinking about them. To a large extent, we
owe our cognitive abilities to apparently completely unconscious processes.
One might object that all this unconscious work involves a lot of thinking
and reasoning.
This might seem like a serious objection, but I think it merely reflects a
terminological discrepancy, because there is nothing substantive to disagree
on regarding fully unconscious “reasoning”. First, everyone can agree on
what the unconscious processes are like. I do not deny that there is a lot of
information processing done completely unconsciously, nor do I deny that it
can be helpful to talk as if this processing was just like conscious thinking
(plausibly, this is so because it is designed to extend and mimic conscious
thinking). Relatedly, I am happy to grant that unconscious processes can be in
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many respects similar to conscious processes (but not in all respects, because
they are not conscious). Second, everyone agrees that unconscious mechanical
processing is probably not truly responsive to contents, because the only
available, non-consciousness-involving account of narrow or cognitive content
is the short-arm conceptual role theory, which no one believes. These seem
to be all the core facts about unconscious processing. The only disagreement
that we can have is on whether or not we should refer to such processing as
“thinking”. I am not particularly attached to my terminological choice, but it
seems reasonable to reserve this term for processes that are in all important
ways the same as the paradigm instances of thinking, which we have seen all
involve consciousness as CPU. We have also seen that the causal powers of
conscious thoughts are quite different from the causal powers of other forms
of representation in the brain (witness the poverty statistics case). For these
reasons, it seems reasonable to reserve the terms “thinking” and “reasoning”
for processes that operate on phenomenal contents.24,25
Empirical evidence regarding unconscious processes is not only consistent
with the phenomenal theory, but it also seems to support it. Many authors
have argued on empirical grounds that consciousness acts as a global workspace
24Mendelovici (forthcoming) develops a similar response to objections from the uncon-
scious to PIT.
25Smithies’ (2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b and 2014) also argues that unconscious informa-
tion processing plays no rational role because it is disconnected from consciousness. This
view coheres nicely with the picture presented here, though Smithies ultimately defends a
different kind of constitutive connection between consciousness and rationality than the
one I defend here. One key difference between Smithies’ view and mine is that Smithies
seems to have a more liberal view of cognitive phenomenology.
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or central information stream that controls high-level decision making and
reasoning.26 This is by far the most widely agreed upon way of distinguishing
between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain. The phenomenal
theory explains why consciousness plays such a central role in the brain:
if consciousness is our only means of being truly responsive to intentional
contents, it makes sense to harness it as a sort of central processing unit. In
this way, empirical evidence regarding the architecture of the mind supports
the hypothesis that consciousness is our means of grasping propositions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that the phenomenal theory, according to which
cognitive content is phenomenal content, offers a promising explanation of
cognitive content, the content to which we are rationally responsive. I first
noted that the phenomenal theory is well suited to explaining the cognitive
contents of perceptual experiences, and that a case can be made that it can
account for the cognitive contents of some thoughts. I then considered whether
the theory can account for the cognitive contents of high-level thoughts,
which seem to pose a major challenge for this theory, and I argued that the
phenomenal theory can accommodate high-level thoughts. The phenomenal
theory does not only accommodate high-level thoughts, but it also sheds
26For example, Baars (1997), Dehaene & Naccache (2001), Dennett (1991), Tye (1995
and 2000), Dretske (1995). The work of Milner & Goodale (1995), is also relevant as
Smithies (2011a, 2014) argues. See the discussion in Bourget forthcoming a, section 4.2,
for more details.
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new light on the limitations of the rational mind. This theory also makes
sense of the apparently central roles of consciousness and inner speech as
components of reasoning processes. I did not argue at length that there is
cognitive content, but I made the case that the phenomenal theory offers
a promising explanation of cognitive content if there is such content. This
helps support the claim that there is cognitive content because, as I noted in
section 1, one of the main reasons for resisting the intuitive view that there is
cognitive content is that such content is in need of an explanation in terms of
something else. I argued that consciousness might well be this something else.
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